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Abstract: In many industrial systems, where safety is of the utmost importance, it is necessary that
expedient tools for accident analysis are available and employed at the design stage. Such tools must be
able to handle large systems in a systematic way and display the factors that are of vital importance for
the functionality of the system. The technique of fault tree analysis (FTA) is commonly used to assess
the failure probability of such systems. The fault tree represents the failure logic of the system in an
inverted tree structure and has the advantage that it provides very good documentation of the way the
failure logic was developed. Conventional fault tree quantication requires a number of assumptions
regarding the system. One of these is that the basic events in the tree occur independently. This
condition is not satised when sequential failures are encountered. Employing alternative methods,
such as Markov methods, can result in the loss of the documentation that represents the failure logic of
the system.
The cause–consequence diagram method is a tool that, like fault tree analysis, documents the failure
logic but has the extra capability enabling the analysis of systems subject to sequential failures. In
addition, the cause–consequence diagram identies the complete set of system responses to any given
initiating event.
This paper is concerned with the cause–consequence diagram method and its application to
sequentially operating systems. It extends previous work by providing more rigorous guidelines to
enable the construction of the diagram and an analysis methodology that can be used when
dependencies exist between the events featured in the decision boxes. A new symbol distinguishing
between events that exist at a specied point in time and those that occur at that time is introduced to
facilitate the analysis.
Keywords: cause–consequence analysis, fault tree analysis, dependencies
1 INTRODUCTION
When investigating potential accident sequences, the
time between the occurrences of events can be an
important parameter [1]. This type of system could be
characterized as one with various shutdown mechanisms
that are initiated given the presence of some initiating
event, e.g. when a pressure limit is exceeded. In order to
identify all relevant accidents for a such a system,
Nielsen stated that the safety assessment tool used must
be able to determine the possible causes of the accident
event and identify the possible consequences given that
one or more of the accident limiting provisions could
fail.
The technique of fault tree analysis (FTA) [2] is
commonly used to assess the probability of failure of
industrial systems. This method represents the failure
logic of the system in an inverted tree structure and
provides very good documentation of the way that the
system failure logic was developed. The FTA technique,
however, is incapable of identifying both the possible
causes of an undesirable event AND all the possible
consequences resulting from it. In addition to this, the
FTA method cannot accurately analyse systems contain-
ing sequential failures. Markov models [3] do not require
the assumption of independence, as with the FTA
method, and can therefore be used accurately to analyse
sequential failures. This modelling technique describes
the system in a state transition diagram. The state
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transition diagram is not as easy to construct as a fault
tree and contains no textual description regarding the
failure logic of the system. As with the FTA method, the
Markov analysis method has the ability to identify the
possible causes of the undesirable events yet is incapable
of identifying all the possible consequences resulting
from it.
A technique has been developed that possesses the
ability to identify the causes of an undesired event and
from this event develop all possible system conse-
quences. The technique is known as the cause–
consequence diagram method. The cause–consequence
diagram method was developed at RISO National
Laboratories, Denmark, in the 1970s, specically to aid
in the reliability and risk analysis of nuclear power plants
in Scandinavian countries [4]. The method was created to
assist in the cause–consequence accident analysis of the
nuclear plants, which involved identication of the
potential modes of failure of individual components
and then relating these causes to the ultimate conse-
quences for the system [5]. The method can be seen as
superior to event tree analysis (ETA) [4], which is also
capable of identifying all consequences of a given critical
event, as it models at component level and therefore is
functionality driven and not subsystem driven. In
addition to this, the cause–consequence diagram method
can account for time delays, which is not a feature
available in the ETA method. Nielsen stated that, as well
as being a tool for illustrating the consequences of
particular failures, the method could also serve as a basis
from which the probability of occurrence of the
individual consequences could be evaluated. The con-
sequences evaluated include those that illustrate the
system functioning as intended and those that illustrate an
undesirable failure sequence. Several authors have used
the technique as the main analysis tool for a safety
assessment [6–9]. However, the documentation of the
quantication of the cause–consequence diagram is
limited and a generalized analysis method or even
rigorous denitions of the meaning of the symbols to
enable quantication is yet to be developed. This is the
subject considered in this paper. Rules for construction
and quantication of the cause–consequence diagram
have been developed and applied to an industrial
system.
The quantication method developed can be auto-
mated for computerized system assessment and has the
capability to deal with dependencies that can occur when
analysing systems whose operation is sequential. These
dependencies include component failures that are re-
peated as causes of more than one decision box event.
The occurrence of such a common event therefore
inuences the outcome of more than one of the decision
boxes in any path. A second class of dependent events
encompasses those events whose failures are inconsis-
tent, and the occurrence of a specic component failure
mode excludes the possibilities of other components
failing, which feature in other parts of the diagram and
are therefore mutually exclusive.
2 CAUSE–CONSEQUENCE DIAGRAM
METHOD
The main principle of the cause–consequence diagram
technique is based on the occurrence of a critical event,
i.e. an event that disturbs the balance of the process plant.
The identication of the critical event is problem
dependent, and choosing the correct place to start is
important as there are very many possible initial events,
not all of which have serious consequences. Focus should
therefore only be made on functional failures of process
components that directly affect the plant balance. Once a
critical event has been identied, all relevant causes of
the critical event and potential consequences are devel-
oped using two conventional reliability analysis methods.
This situation is represented in Fig. 1.
The two reliability analysis tools used in the develop-
ment of the cause–consequence diagram method are the
FTA method and the ETA method. The FTA method is
used in two independent situations to describe the causes
of an undesired event. Firstly, the technique is used to
describe the causes of the critical event. The second
function for the fault tree method is to describe the failure
causes of the accident-limiting systems (emergency
shutdown systems). The event tree method is used as
the link between the causes of the critical event and the
various consequences that could result. The method is
used to identify the various paths that the system could
take, following the critical event, depending on whether
certain subsystems/components function correctly or not.
The relationship between the two reliability methods is
shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 1 Simple representation of a cause–consequence dia-
gram structure
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3 SYMBOLS FOR CONSTRUCTION
The symbols used for the construction of a cause–
consequence diagram are depicted in Table 1. The overall
structure of the cause–consequence diagram method is
depicted in Fig. 3.
4 RULES FOR CONSTRUCTION
Rules for the construction of a cause–consequence
diagram can be detailed in two separate sections, those
for the cause part of the diagram and those for the
consequence part of the diagram. For the cause part it
should be noted that the rules postulated are those used in
the construction of a fault tree structure. The rules for the
construction of the cause diagram can be summarized as a
three-step procedure:
1. Identication of the top event. The construction of the
cause diagram begins with the denition of the
undesired event, i.e. the system failure of interest.
2. Cause diagram development. Using a deductive
process, the causes of the undesired event are
discovered and connected by means of logical gates.
The procedure is repeated until all events have been
fully developed, i.e. the basic events are reached.
3. Validation of the diagram. For each gate used, all
inputs must be both necessary and sufcient to
produce the output event.
Similarly, a set of rules were devised for the construction
of the consequence diagram:
1. Component ordering. The rst step of the cause–
consequence diagram construction is deciding on the
order in which component failure events are to be
taken. To ensure a logical development of the causes
of the system failure mode, it was decided that the
ordering should follow the temporal action of the
system, for example the system activation for the
function required given an initial critical event.
2. Consequence diagram development. The second stage
involves the actual construction of the diagram.
Starting from the initiating component, the function-
ality of each component or subsystem is investigated
and the consequences of these sequences determined.
If the decision box is governed by a subsystem, then
the probability of failure will be obtained via a fault
tree diagram.
3. Reduction . If any decision boxes are deemed irrele-
vant, for example the boxes attached to the NO and
YES branches are identical and their outcomes and
consequences are the same, then these should be
removed and the diagram reduced to a minimal form.
Removal of these boxes will in no way affect the end
result.
5 RULES FOR QUANTIFICATION
The procedure for analysing an independent system
modelled using a cause–consequence diagram begins
with the assignment of probabilities/frequencies to each
outlet branch stemming from a decision box. Following
this, the probability of any one sequence is obtained by
multiplication of the probabilities associated with each
decision box in that sequence [10]. The probability of any
particular consequence is then obtained by the summa-
tion of the probability of each sequence that terminates in
that consequence. This procedure, however, cannot be
employed unless the failures of each decision box in a
sequence are independent. Dependencies can exist in the
cause–consequence diagram, and these must be dealt
with prior to the quantication of the diagram.
5.1 Rules for dependent failure events
5.1.1 Common failure events
The rst dependency that can arise is that the same failure
event exists in more than one fault tree structure on the
same path in the cause–consequence diagram. In order to
deal with a common failure event, the event is extracted
from the fault tree structures and placed in a new decision
box preceding the rst decision box that contains the
common failure event. The original cause–consequence
diagram is then duplicated on each outlet branch
stemming from the new decision box. Following the
NO outlet branch of the new decision box, the failure
event is set to TRUE in any fault tree structure in which it
is found. Similarly, following the YES outlet branch, the
Fig. 2 Basic structure of a cause–consequence diagram
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Table 1 Symbols used for construction of a cause–consequence diagram
Symbols for cause diagram Function description
AND GATE:
Allows causality to pass up through the tree if at any time all inputs to the gate occur
OR GATE:
Allows causality to pass up through the tree if at any time at least one input to the gate occurs
Symbol for consequence diagram Function description
The decision box represents the functionality of a component/system. The NO box represents failure to
perform correctly, the probability of which is obtained via a fault tree or single component failure
probability qi
Fault tree arrow represents the number of the fault tree structure that corresponds to the decision box
The initiator triangle represents the initiating event for a sequence where l indicates the rate of occurrence
Time delay 1 indicates that the time starts from the time at which the delay symbol is entered and
continues up to the end of the time interval in the delay symbol
OR gate symbol:
Used to simplify the cause–consequence diagram when more than one decision box enters the same
decision box or consequence box
Existence decision box represents a component existing in a certain state
Consequence box represents the outcome event due to a particular sequence of events
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probability of failure of the common failure event is
set to FALSE in any fault tree structure in which it is
present.
5.1.2 Inconsistent failure events
In certain systems, components are required to perform
different functions which, if successfully accomplished,
results in the components residing in different states at
different times. For example, initially a valve may be
required to be closed and later in the sequence be open.
For systems that are not in continuous operation, certain
component failures could occur between operations. For
example, the valve could fail between operations, which
would be the cause of the valve being closed at the start of
the next sequence, and later in the sequence the valve
would be unable to open. To illustrate this, the simple
cause–consequence diagram section shown in Fig. 4 can
be utilized with the relevant fault trees depicted in Fig. 5.
In this example, the component K2 is required to
perform two different functions; rstly to close-decision
box 1, and then, later in the sequence, to open-decision
box 3. In order to model this type of failure accurately,
the cause–consequence diagram requires modication
Fig. 3 Cause–consequence diagram structure
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prior to quantication. Employing a basic event labelling
convention in a fault tree structure can be used to identify
an inconsistent failure event. If two labels are the same
apart from the last character, then they are deemed as
inconsistent failure events and the rst failure event
represents the decision box containing the rst failure
mode and the second failure event represents the decision
box containing the second failure mode. This can be seen
for the cause–consequence diagram in Fig. 4, where Ft1
contains the basic event K2CO, the rst failure mode, and
Ft3 contains the basic event K2CC, the second failure
mode. Following the identication of an inconsistent
failure event, the second failure mode is inspected and,
depending on whether the second failure mode is an
unrevealed or revealed failure event, the cause–conse-
quence diagram is different. If the second failure mode is
a revealed failure, then it cannot fail between operations
and be undetected. Therefore, the time to failure of the
second failure mode is set equal to the time it takes the
system to travel from the rst failure event to the second
failure event. If, on the other hand, the second failure
mode is unrevealed, then it can occur between operations
and be undetected. When this situation occurs, the second
failure mode is extracted and placed in an existence
decision box preceding the rst failure event. The cause–
consequence diagram is then duplicated on both outlet
branches and, following the YES outlet branch of the
existence decision box, the decision box containing the
rst failure mode is governed by the failure of the second
failure mode. The second failure mode probability is set
equal to 1 in all decision boxes beneath the existence
decision box, and the rst failure mode is set equal to 0.
Therefore, for Fig. 4, assuming K2CC is an unrevealed
failure event, the cause–consequence diagram illustrated
in Fig. 6 would be created and reduced to the form shown
in Fig. 7.
Following the NO outlet branch of the existence
decision box results in the same scenario as if the failure
had in fact been a revealed failure. Therefore, the second
failure event occurs in the time it takes the system to
travel from the rst failure event to the second failure
event.
Following the inspection of each sequence path in the
cause–consequence diagram, and modication due to any
identied dependent failure events, the cause–conse-
quence diagram can be quantied by multiplying the
probability associated with each decision box in each
sequence. The probability of any consequence is then
obtained via the summation of the probability of any
sequence that terminates in that consequence.
6 PRESSURE TANK SYSTEM
The system used to illustrate the construction of a cause–
consequence diagram is a pressure tank system that
contains a start-up, shutdown sequence in addition to its
operational phase [11]. The system conguration is given
in Fig. 8 and the component individual functions and
failure modes are represented in Table 2.
Initially, the system is considered to be in a dormant
state and therefore de-energized. Switch S1 and relay
contacts K1 and K2 are all open when in the dormant
state, and the timer and pressure switch contacts are
Fig. 4 Example cause–consequence diagram
Fig. 5 Fault trees for the example cause–consequence diagram
Proc Instn Mech Engrs Vol 215 Part E E03200 Ó IMechE 2001
212 L M RIDLEY AND J D ANDREWS
closed. Depressing switch S1 provides power to the coil
of K1 which results in the closure of the K1 contacts.
Relay K1 self-latches when S1 opens when released, and
power is also supplied to K2, resulting in K2 contacts
closing, which starts the pump motor. It is assumed that
the tank takes 30 min to ll, and once the pressure
threshold is reached the pressure switch contacts open,
de-energizing K2, which results in the removal of power
from the pump motor. After a period of time the tank
becomes empty and the pressure switch closes, which
energizes K2. The pump restarts and the lling process
commences again. The tank is lled twice daily and the
system is inspected at 6 monthly intervals for dormant
failures.
In the event of the pressure switch failing to open, a
safety feature is included in the form of the timer relay.
Power is applied to the timer relay following the closure
of the K1 contacts, which initiates a clock. If the clock
registers 30 min of continuous pumping, then the timer
relay contacts are opened which results in a break in the
circuit to K1 and system shutdown.
The rules developed for the construction of a cause–
Fig. 6 Modied cause–consequence diagram for inconsistent failure modes
Fig. 7 Reduced cause–consequence diagram for inconsistent failure modes
E03200 Ó IMechE 2001 Proc Instn Mech Engrs Vol 215 Part E
RELIABILITY OF SEQUENTIAL SYSTEMS 213
consequence diagram were used to construct the cause–
consequence diagram for the pressure tank system:
Step 1. Component failure event ordering. The ordering
of the components for the construction of the cause–
consequence diagram is selected by considering the
temporal patterns of the system. For the pressure tank
system, switch S1 is depressed, followed by its
opening. Relay K1 energizes and powers K2 which
powers the pump. Following 30 min of operation, the
pressure switch should open. In the event that the
pressure switch fails to open, the timer should time out
and the timer contacts open. Given that the pressure
switch opens, K2 contacts should de-energize, remov-
Fig. 8 Pressure tank system
Table 2 Component functions and failure modes
Component Function Failure modes Effect on system Failure type
Switch S1 To apply power to coil of relay K1 S1C: Switch failed closed Circuit remains energized but can
be broken by K2
Unrevealed
S1O: Switch failed open No power to energize circuit Revealed
Relay K1 Electrically self-latched, applying
power to relay K2
K1D: Relay fails de-energized No power to circuit Revealed
K1CC: Contact fails closed Circuit remains energized but can
be broken by K2
Unrevealed
K1CO: Contact fails open No power to circuit Revealed
Relay K2 Delivers power to the motor K2D: Relay fails de-energized No power to motor Revealed
K2CC: Contact fails closed Continuous power to motor Revealed
K2CO: Contact fails open No power to motor Revealed
Timer relay (TIM) Provides emergency shutdown in
event of pressure switch failing
TIMCC: Timer contact fails
closed
Circuit energized but PRSW can
open
Unrevealed
TIMCO: Timer contact fails
open
No power to motor Revealed
Pressure switch (PRSW) De-energizes coil of K2 when tank
is full
PSWC: Fails closed Continuous power to motor Revealed
PSWO: Fails open No power to motor Revealed
Fuse To prevent power surge F: Fails broken No power to motor Revealed
Power supplies 1 and 2 Supplies power to relays and motor PS1, PS2: No power No power to motor Revealed
Motor Pumps uid into tank M: Fails broken No power to pump Revealed
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ing power from the pump. Where the timer is required
to break the circuit containing K1, K1 contacts should
de-energize, removing power from K2, which results
in the removal of the power supply to the pump. The
ordering was therefore chosen to be
S1, K1, K2, pressure switch, timer relay, K1, K2
It can be seen that the components K1 and K2 both
occur twice in the ordering sequence. This is the result
of the system containing two different phases, and
hence some components perform different actions in
each different phase. The components K1 and K2 are
both required to close in the start-up sequence and open
in the shutdown sequence.
Steps 2 and 3. Cause–consequence diagram construction
and reduction. The cause–consequence diagram was
constructed by considering the effect of each compo-
nent in the chosen order on the system performance. In
order to highlight relevant features, only one lling
sequence is investigated, the cause–consequence dia-
gram of which is given in Fig. 9. The corresponding
fault trees are illustrated in Fig. 10.
7 SYSTEM QUANTIFICATION
Prior to multiplying the probabilities associated with each
decision box in each sequence, the cause–consequence
diagram was checked for any dependent failure events.
The following dependent failure events were identied*
1. Inconsistent failure event present in Ft1 and Ft2 as the
switch is required to close, represented by decision box
1, and then open, represented by decision box 2. The
second failure event, SIFC, is an unrevealed failure
Fig. 9 Cause–consequence diagram for the pressure tank system
* Following each of the seven modications outlined, the cause–
consequence diagram may change. These changes result in the duplication
of certain parts of the diagram that may contain the inconsistent failures
mentioned; e.g. the inconsistent failures detailed in 2 and 3 occur more than
once and are handled in an identical manners.
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event (Table 2) and is therefore extracted and placed in
an existence decision box preceding decision box 1.
The cause–consequence diagram is modied using the
procedure detailed in Section 5.1.2.
2. Inconsistent failure event present in Ft3 and Ft5 as the
pressure switch is required to be closed and then open.
The second failure event, PSWC, is a revealed failure
event (Table 2) and the time to failure of PSWC is set
equal to 30 min (the lling time).
3. Inconsistent failure event present in Ft3 and Ft6 as K2
contacts are required to close and, following the tank
ll, open. The second failure event, K2CC, is a
revealed failure event (Table 2) and the time to failure
of K2CC is set equal to 30 min (the lling time).
4. Common failure event present in Ft7 and Ft8. PS1 is
extracted and placed in a new decision box preceding
decision box 7. The cause–consequence diagram is
modied following the procedure detailed in Section
5.1.1.
5. Inconsistent failure event present in Ft7 and Ft12 as K1
contacts are required to close and then open. The
second failure event, K1CC, is an unrevealed failure
event (Table 2) and is therefore extracted and placed in
an existence decision box. The cause–consequence
diagram is modied using the procedure detailed in
Section 5.1.2.
6. Inconsistent failure event present in Ft7 and Ft11 as
the timer contacts are closed and may be required to
open later in the sequence. The second failure event,
TIMCC, is an unrevealed failure event (Table 2) and is
therefore extracted and placed in an existence decision
box. The cause–consequence diagram is modied
using the procedure detailed in Section 5.1.2.
Following the appropriate modication owing to the
dependent failure events identied, the nal cause–
consequence diagram was developed and is shown in
Figs 11 and 12, with the corresponding fault trees given
in Fig. 13. The probability of the system entering an
overpressurized state was obtained using the component
failure data shown in Table 3.
The system functions twice daily and therefore the
time between operations is 12 h. The probability of
failure for revealed failures between operations was
hence obtained using equation (1) with t ˆ 12 h. For
unrevealed failures the probability of failure was
obtained using y and t, given in Table 3, and equation
(2):
Q ˆ 1 ¡ e¡lt …1†
QAV ˆ l
y
2
‡ t
³ ´
…2†
The probability of each fault tree was calculated using the
inclusion–exclusion method (7), and the probability of
overpressure was obtained by summing the probabilities
of any sequence that terminated in the consequence ‘O’.
There existed 12 such paths, and the probability of
overpressure was calculated to equal 1.12 £ 10¡5. In
addition to obtaining the probability of overpressure, the
probability of the tank being empty, a safe operation and
a normal operation can also be calculated and shown to
equal
P (normal operation) ˆ 0:766
P (safe operation) ˆ 0:2213
P (empty tank) ˆ 1:21 £ 10¡2
Fig. 10 Fault trees for the pressure tank cause–consequence diagram
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Fig. 12 Second page of the nal cause–consequence diagram for the pressure tank system
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8 CONCLUSIONS
The main advantage of the FTA method is that the failure
logic of a system is well documented on the fault tree
structure. Conventional fault tree quantication, how-
ever, requires a number of assumptions, which renders
the analysis of sequential or dependent systems inaccu-
rate. For such systems, an accurate analysis can be
obtained via a Markov model, but the state transition
diagram used in the Markov analysis holds no textual
description regarding the failure logic of the system.
The cause–consequence diagram method enables
Fig. 13 Fault tree structures for Figs 11 and 12
Table 3 Failure data for pressure tank system
Component Failure rate Inspection interval, y Mean time to repair, t
Switch S1 S1FC: 1 £ 10¡6 4368.0 36.0
S1FO: 8.698 £ 10¡4 NA NA
Relay K1 K1D: 0.23 £ 10¡6 NA NA
K1CC: 0.23 £ 10¡6 4368.0 36.0
K1CO: 0.23 £ 10¡6 NA NA
Relay K2 K2D: 0.23 £ 10¡6 NA NA
K2CC: 0.23 £ 10¡6 NA NA
K2CO: 0.23 £ 10¡6 NA NA
Timer relay TCC: 1 £ 10¡4 4368.0 36.0
TCO: 1 £ 10¡4 NA NA
Pressure switch PSWC: 1 £ 10¡4 NA NA
PSWO: 1 £ 10¡4 NA NA
Fuse F: 1 £ 10¡5: NA NA
Power supplies 1 and 2 PS1: 1 £ 10¡6 NA NA
PS2: 1 £ 10¡6 NA NA
Motor M: 1 £ 10¡6 NA NA
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sequential or dependent systems to be modelled accu-
rately with the retention of the failure logic for the
system. In addition to this, more than one consequence
can be modelled at a time as the cause–consequence
diagram documents all system outcomes from a given
critical event. In order to extend the capabilities of the
cause–consequence diagram method, a list of construc-
tion and quantication rules have been developed and
illustrated using an example system. In particular, this
paper provides more rigorous denitions of the symbols
used and the approach to be adopted to construct the
cause–consequence diagram. A new symbol is intro-
duced to distinguish between events that exist at a
specied time and those that occur at that time. Once the
cause–consequence diagram is constructed, its quanti-
cation can be complicated by dependencies between the
events represented by the decision boxes. An approach to
resolving this problem is given that can be automated
within a computational analysis methodology. Depen-
dencies attributed to either repeated events or incon-
sistent events can be accounted for in this way.
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